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The identification of the existence of strategic groups within Portuguese franchising constitutes the 
main aim of the present paper. An empirical study starting from 128 franchising chains operating in 
Portugal was carried out. The results reveal the existence of five perfectly differentiated strategic groups 
(franchisor types), which are described starting from the strategic variables that define them. Our main 
contribution is that the results obtained in the Portuguese franchising system are similar to precedent 
studies in Canada, USA and Spain. That result suggests a tendency toward the globalization of franchisor 
types. 
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TIPOS DE EXPLORAI;AO NO FRANCHISING PORTUGUES 
Resumo 
A identifica'<ao da existencia de grupos estrab§gicos no ambito do franchising portugues constitui o 
aspecto central deste artigo. 0 presente estudo empfrico realizado tern como enfoque as 128 correntes de 
franchising que operam em Portugal. 
Os resultados revelam a existencia de 5 grupos estrategicos que sao diferenciados a partir das 
variaveis estrategicas que os definem. Neste estudo podemos concluir que os resultados obtidos no siste-
ma portugues de franchising sao simi lares aos estudos precedentes no Canada, EUA e Espanha, verifican-
do-se assim uma tendencia para a globaliza'<ao nos tipos de explora'<ao. 
Palavras Chave: grupos estrategicos, franchising, analise factorial. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The franchising system presents a series of typical features. Firstly, its 
increasing importance in the area of commercial distribution must be emphasized. 
Secondly, the number of franchisors and franchisees is increasing regularly. This 
idea is valid for a wide spectrum of countries from those that are developing to the 
most commercially advanced. For example, in The United States at the end of the 
80s the franchising system was valued as representing around 34 % of the retail 
market share (Dfez and Galan, 1989) and at present it is estimated at over 50 % 
of the retail market share (Falbe, Dandridge and Kumar, 1999). 
Portugal is no exception, and franchising is a growing business although it 
has suffered a certain delay compared to other countries of the European Union 
(EU). A high number of international franchising chains arrived at Portugal the 
second half of the 80s, at the same time that Portugal became member of the EU. 
Table 1 shows the evolution of franchisors in Portugal since 1990. The number 
of franchisors has grown from 31 in 1990 to 390 in 2004. Also, the number of 
franchisees has increased from 2634 in 1997 to 9160 in 2004. 
TABLE 1 
Evolution of franchisors in Portugal 
Source: Census '0 Franchising em Portugal', do IIF- lnst. de lnforma~ao en Franchising. 
The franchising system has definitely won over Portuguese managers, who 
have started to use this business format in their commercial development, 
independently of the size of firms. This fact has produced an amazing number of 
new franchisors of Portuguese origin, in fact reaching 44% of all franchisors 
established in Portugal (see table 2). 
TABLE 2 
Evolution of Portuguese franchisors 
Years 1995 1996 1197 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Portuguese 19 31 47 78 123 120 135 135 154 173 Franchisors 
Source: Census '0 Franchising em Portugal', do IIF- lnst. de lnforma~ao en Franchising. 
As such, the franchise system continues its high development and contributes 
importantly to the modernization of retailing. Nevertheless, research on franchising 
has not developed in parallel with the evolution of the sector. The reasons for this 
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are diverse (Dfez and Rondim, 2004): ignorance of franchising at an academic 
level, scarce study of the institutions or distribution companies, secretive clauses 
in franchising contracts that prevent franchisors and franchisees from revealing 
information, and, finally, the need for comprehensive knowledge of all the firm's 
component areas (Organization, Marketing, Financial Economy and Accounting) 
as well as legal aspects (especially commercial law). 
2. SCHEME OF RESEARCH ON FRANCHISING 
Elango and Fried (1997) published an important contribution on franchising 
research. These authors carried out a wide and relevant review of the scientific 
research on franchising for the scientific community, and it provides a good starting 
point for the consolidation of franchising as a research stream. Based on the work 
of Elango and Fried (1997), a classification of the research lines on franchising 
was proposed (table 3). Later, sections where research has been important and 
others where it was practically non-existent were revealed (Dfez, Rondim and 
Navarro, 2004). Our scheme is different from that of Elango and Fried (1997) in 
some ways, such as, it has a higher number of research lines, and updated 
bibliographic revision has been made, and this classification proposes research 
lines independently of the existence of articles published in each topic. In this 
context, four lines of research were established: 
1. Social Reasons of franchising. 
2. Research about the franchisor. 
3. Research about the franchisee. 
4. Fran~hisor-franchisee relationship. 
Related to research on franchisors, one of the most commonly studied topics 
is the definition of the reasons that managers think about in order to grow through 
franchising instead of using other alternatives (own units). Of the theories that 
explain the reasons for franchising expansion, basically two have received more 
scientific support by researchers (Alan, 2001; Combs y Ketchen, 2003): 
a. Resource Scarcity Theory. Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969) proposed that firms 
franchise in order to access to scarce resources, particularly capital and 
managerial resources, in order to attain a quick expansion. When firms are 
very young and small, have difficulties in obtaining money through traditional 
financial markets or from existing operators, and likewise, they find it difficult 
to develop the necessary managerial talent (Shane, 1996). Nevertheless, 
rapid expansion may be essential in order to build the economies of scale in 
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TABLE 3 
Proposed classification of research about franchising 
a) Social advantages 
b) Social-economics advantages 
1. Social reasons for c) Social inconvenients d) Social balance of franchising franchising 
e) Franchising contract 
f) Ethic in franchising 
e) Franchising favours competition 
- Financial resources 
a) Reasons to franchise - Staff 
-Market knowledge 
2. Franchisor -Others b) Own units versus franchised units 
c) Franchising Internationalization 
d) Choice of franchisees 
e) Franchisee unit locations 
a) Reasons for integration in a franchise - Independence of franchisee 
system - Risk in franchising 
3. Franchisee - Franchise system choice 
b) Choice of franchisor - Franchisor choice technics 
- Information provided by the 
franchisor 
-Power 





4. Franchisor/ Franchisee b) Behaviour -Conflict 
Relationships .. -Trust 
- Profit 
c) Economic Performance - Profitability 
- Market share 
- Commitment 
d) Non Economic Performance - Satisfaction 
-Loyalty 
Source: Dlez de Castro, Rondan and Navarro (2004) 
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purchasing and advertising which are necessary to compete effectively against 
established firms (Combs and Castrogiovanni, 1994). Some authors assert 
that firms develop franchising in their early years because of their lack of 
managerial expertise and capital needed to grow, and franchisees are able to 
provide them both (Combs and Ketchen, 1999). Several studies have tried to 
explain franchising expansion based on Resource Scarcity Theory postulates 
(Lafontaine and Kaufmann, 1994; Norton, 1995; Bradach, 1998; Combs, 
Ketchen, and Hoover, 2004; Castrogiovanni, Combs and Justis, 2006). 
b. Agency Theory. Agency contracts consist on a relationship in which one 
part (the principal) delegates authority to a second (the agent). Each part 
is assumed to be self-interested and to possess independent goals, so the 
principal has to drive resources to ensure that the agent acts in the principal's 
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best interest. With regard to franchising, franchisors act as principals 
delegating authority to other agents (either employees managers or 
franchisees). The principal has two basic tools at his/her disposal to 
guarantee agent cooperation: monitoring agent behaviour and offering 
incentives tied to agent outputs. Franchising largely alleviates the 
franchisor's need for costly monitoring of unit managers because franchisees 
are the most interested in improving their outlet's profits (Norton, 1988a). 
Typically, franchisees make substantial investments in their outlets and 
the anticipated profit stream from these investments depends on franchisees' 
continued best effort (Klein, 1995). Therefore, franchisees are highly 
motivated to maximize the performance of their outlets and also, to reduce 
franchisors' need to monitor franchisees (Bradach, 1997). Agency Theory 
claims that firms franchise when doing so minimizes agency cost via the 
best available alignment between outlet managers' incentives and the firms' 
objectives. The basic principles of Agency Theory have underpinned many 
articles about franchising (Hunt, 1973; Caves and Murphy, 1976; Rubin, 
1978; Mathewson and Winter, 1985; Brickley and Dark, 1987; Martin, 1988 
and 1993; Norton, 1988a and 1988b; Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, 1991; 
Krueger, 1991; Lafontaine, 1992; Lafontaine and Shaw, 1996; Shane, 1996; 
Calderon, 1998; Mora, 2002; Lopez and Ventura, 2002; Combs, Ketchen 
and Hoover, 2004; Castrogiovanni, Combs and Justis, 2006. ). 
Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) and Combs and Castrogiovanni (1994) 
demonstrated that both theories are more complementary than rival, and they 
jointly serve to explain the reasons why firms adopt the franchising system. To 
summarize, it can be affirmed that the main reasons that stimulate franchising 
are: scarcity of financial and human resources, motivation of the franchisees, 
market knowledge and control of the franchisees. However, according to these 
authors the main contributions of their works are not the aforementioned ones, 
but the discovery of the existence of five groups of franchisors (strategic groups) in 
the franchise system. Furthermore, they pointed out the need for repeating their 
study in other countries in order to confirm and generalize their results. Some 
articles related to the identification of strategic groups have been published since 
then, which led us to introduce a new research stream inside studies about 
franchisors, and this is the focus of our study. 
3. OBJECTIVES 
As just stated, this work can be located inside the research stream about 
franchisors. In light of this background, the identification of strategic groups in the 
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Portuguese franchising is the main goal of this study. Concretely, the research 
objectives are as follows: 
1. To identify the existence of 'franchisor typ.es' based on the configuration of 
strategic groups in the Portuguese franchise system. 
2. Subject to confirmation of the previous objective, to analyse and feature 
the strategic groups found. 
As a means to achieve these goals some steps have been developed. Firstly, 
a literature review identifying the antecedents of strategic groups in franchising to 
support two hypotheses was performed. Secondly, a methodology to contrast the 
hypotheses is proposed. Finally, the most important results, conclusions, limitations 
and future research are presented. 
4. LITERATURE BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
The term 'strategic group' was introduced by Hunt (1972) in order to describe 
the structure of a sector in relation to the companies that compete in it. Since 
then it has become one of the basic props on which the development of Strategic 
Management has been sustained as a knowledge area. 
A strategic group can be defined as a set of companies that, within a sector 
of activity or industry, develops a similar strategy from its strategic dimensions 
(Porter, 1979). It does not mean that they should have identical performance 
(Combs, et al. 2004), since they can differ with respect to the resources, skills or 
capacities possessed (Thomas and Carroll, 1994, Mcnamara et al. 2003). 
Through strategic groups it is possible to explain the competitive position of 
every company of the sector in relation to its competitors. Therefore, the study and 
analysis of strategic groups in a managerial sector helps us to understand its structure, 
as well as the dynamics of the competition and the evolution of the sector itself 
(Barroso et al. 2001). In any case, the identification of strategic groups requires the 
fulfilment of two necessary and complementary conditions (Nath and Gruca, 1997): 
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• The variables or dimensions that define the strategy are really strategic 
and, therefore, they cannot be modified in the short term. Modification 
would entail incurring high change costs, such as high investments in 
both tangible (monetary, human, etc.) and intangible resources (learning, 
know-how, etc.). If this condition is not supported, identifying strategic 
groups within a sector is very difficult, despite application of certain 
statistical tools (factor analysis, cluster analysis, etc.), as Nath and 
Sudharshan, 1994, indicated. 
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• The difficulty of modifying the variables that define the managerial strategies 
in a short timespan must create barriers of mobility among the different 
strategic groups. And, this fact prevents or impedes the movement of 
companies from one group to another. That is to say, they are a source of 
competitive advantage for the members of the group that possesses them 
and cannot be rapidly obtained by the components of other groups (Barroso 
et al. 2001). 
In consequence, the strategic groups can be considered as groups of firms 
that are separated from each other depending on the barriers of mobility that 
determine their competitive behavior. Barriers of mobility are some of the reasons 
that explain the differences with regards to the performance of the different strategic 
groups (Lee et al. 2002). 
The identification and analysis of strategic groups has been carried out in 
different contexts of activity: the building sector (Molina and Quer, 2003), the 
pharmaceutical industry (Cool and Schendel, 1987), the bank sector (Mas, 1996; 
Mcnamara et al. 2003), retailing (Barroso et al. 2001), the hospitals sector (Nath 
and Sudharshan, 1994; Nath and Gruca, 1997), the hotel sector (Baum and 
Mezias, 1992), the insurance sector (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1990; 1993), 
and internationalization (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1985), among others. 
In addition, these approaches have spread into franchising. A pioneering 
work in the scientific research on types of franchisors is that of Carney and Gedajlovic 
(1991). Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) worked with a Canadian sample of 128 
franchising chains that operated in Quebec in 1988. They use 13 measures, grouped 
into 7 strategic dimensions (table 4). Based on the results obtained, they identified 
five strategic groups in franchising (table 5). 
A second interesting article about strategic groups in franchising in the USA 
was published by Castrogiovanni et al. (1995). Data were extracted from the 
magazine 'Entrepreneur' in 1991, comprising 717 franchising chains belonging 
to 28 sectors. The variables considered as strategic in this study were very similar 
to those used by Carney and Gedajlovic ( 1991). The results of Castrogiovanni et 
al. (1995) using the same procedure as Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) confirm 
the strategies of 'rapid growth franchisors' and 'reconverted' entirely and 'mature 
franchisors' partially. Nevertheless, the 'expensive conservative' and 'not successful' 
strategic groups were identified by variables of a different nature from those of 
Carney and Gedajlovic (1991). 
Lopez and Ventura (2001) presented a third article continuing this research 
stream. Their database was built from various Spanish Franchising Yearbooks, 
supported by surveys. The sample was 228 franchisors operating in Spain in 
1996. They employed 12 variables, of which 8 were the same as the study of 
Carney and Gedajlovic (1991). Furthermore, they detected the existence of five 
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TABLE 4 
Variables and strategic dimensions of Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) 
Strategic dimensions Operative Variables 
A. Size 01. Number of outlets 
B. Dispersion 02. % of outlets located in Quebec 
C. Growth 03. Outlets opened per year from the birth of the firm 
04. Franchise opened per year from the beginning of the franchising system 
05. Average investment that is necessary for the franchisee candidate 
D. Cost of adhesion 06. Entry Fee 
(price of franchising) 07. Royalty(% of sales) 
08. Advertising fee (% of sales) 
E. Contract 09. Contract length (years) 
F. Vertical integration 10. %of outlets franchised (confidence in franchising) 
11. Age of the company (years since inception) 
G. Timing 12. Years franchising 
13. Years pre-franchising (years between inception and firs franchise) 
Source: Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) 
TABLE 5 
Franchisor strategies according to Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) 
Strategy Features 
• Characterized by the search for rapid growth, with a high number of annual 
Rapid Growers openings both of franchised units and own outlets. 
• Young franchising chains (limited age). 
• They adopted the franchising system immediately. 
• High cost of adhesion. 
Conservative • They are expensive since initial investment, entry fee and advertising fee 
expensive demanded have the highest values in the resulting groups. 
• They are conservative due to the fact that the duration of the contract is the 
longest of the groups studied. 
• The companies included in this group are the oldest. 
• They have developed a strategy of own units for a long time and recently 
Franchise converts they have adopted franchising as a growth strategy. 
• They have grown slowly during the own units stage and much more rapidly 
from their expansion into franchising. 
• This is the group of franchisors that have been in franchising the longest. 
Mature franchisers • Their age is high, though a few years passed from their start in the sector to 
when they adopted the franchising formula. 
• They are the franchising chains that present a greater number of outlets. 
• This is the second youngest group. 
• They adopt quickly the franchising system as growth strategy. 
Unsuccessful • Few own outlets. Their expansion is mainly via franchising, the percentage 
of franchised units is the highest of the groups considered. 
• This is the group that required the lowest fees, presenting few requirements 
of adhesion. Nevertheless, their growth is limited. 
Source: Carney y Gedajlovic (1991) 
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strategic groups, which they called: Emergents, Standardizables, Large 
Internationals, Traditional and Unsatisfactory. These authors affirm that, though 
they used a different denomination: 'globally, the identified groups are equivalent 
to those of Carney and Gedajlovic's study'. 
Finally, a recent study from Rondan et al. (2006) about franchising in 
Spain should be mentioned. They collected data from 699 franchising chains 
included in various Spanish Franchising Yearbooks in 2004. The results 
confirmed the existence of five strategic groups in the Spanish franchise system: 
'expensive franchisors', 'convert franchisors', 'mature franchisors', 'rapid 
growers franchisors' and 'unsuccessful'. The first three types are identified 
completely with Carney y Gedajlovic' ones, but the other two are only partially 
associ a ted. 
are: 
The hypotheses to contrast in the study that arise from the literature review 
H1: In Portuguese franchise system types of franchisors can be identified. 
H2: In Portuguese franchise system five types of franchisors can be identified 
(rapid growers, conservatives, re-converted, matures and unsuccessful). 
5. METHODOLOGY 
5.1. VARIABLES AND DATA ANALYSIS 
Given that one of the goals of this work is to study franchising globalization, 
the same 13 variables considered in the work of Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) 
have been analysed in order to enable a comparison with their study. 
The database includ~s information from 128 franchising chains from diverse 
sources in Portugal for years 2004 and 2005. Concretely, data sources were the 
following: 
• Journal: Franchising - Direct6rio de Oportunidades 2005, Institute de 
lnformac;ao em Franchising. 
• Journal: Neg6cios e Franchising- special 2004, Institute de lnformac;ao 
em Franchising. 
• Journal: Neg6cios e Franchising, May-June 2005, Institute de lnformac;ao 
em Franchising. 
• Website from Institute de lnformac;ao em Franchising -
www.infofranchising.pt. 
• Website from Franchising Portugal - www.franchising.pt. 
• Website from Portuguese Franchising Association - www.apfranchise.org 
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As Nath and Gruca (1997) indicated, the identification of strategic groups in 
any sector of activity can be done following three alternative and non-exclusive 
methods (or complementaries) 
1. Factor Analysis and grouping information from archive data. 
2. Construction of multidimensional scales (multidimensional scaling) from 
the managerial perceptions of a set of specific attributes of the industry. 
3. Identification and direct classification of the different competitive companies 
from the analysis of executives of the sector. 
The configuration of our database was derived from archive data, therefore, 
the first of the methodologies proposed by Nath and Gruca (1997) was chosen, 
this also being followed by Carney and Gedajlovic ( 1991), Castrogiovanni et al. 
(1995), Lopez and Ventura (2001) and Rondan et al (2006). 
In this respect, to contrast H2, an exploratory factor analysis was carried 
out, imputing the missing values with the average of every variable and applying 
rotation varimax. From the rotated components matrix, we retain the factors 
whose eigenvalues are over 1. The classification of each firm, in each group, 
was carried out paying attention to the higher factorial score reached by each 
of the franchising chains with regard to each of the resultant factors of the 
factor analysis. The companies that did not obtain a factorial score over 0.1 in any 
factor were not classified, following the recommendations of Carney and Gedajlovic 
(1991) and Lopez and Ventura (2001 ). As a result, the grouped companies were 
88. 
The Hypothesis H1 was tested using a two-stage procedure. First, a contrast 
of averages comparison for groups was carried out, using Kruskai-Wallis's test, in 
order to verify if the franchisor groups in every factor differ significantly from other 
groups. Secondly, cluster analysis was used to generate alternative groups and to 
compare them with the groups derived from the factorial analysis. 
6. RESULTS 
The factor rotated matrix, after eight iterations, reveals the existence of five 
factors, which are those which have eigenvalues over 1 (table 6). 
Factor 1 joins some variables related to the cost of adhesion of the chain, 
such as 'average investment', 'entry fee' and 'advertising fee', and other variables: 
'contract length' and 'number of outlets'. Factor 2 includes: 'age of the company', 
'years pre-franchising' and 'years franchising'. Factor 3 combines: 'geographical 
dispersion' (negative sign) and 'Outlets opened per year'. Factor 4 comprises the 
growth variable: 'franchises opened per year' and'% of outlets franchised'. Factor 
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TABLE 6 
Factor analysis with varimax rotation 
Factor 1 Factor loadings 
05. Average investment 0.702 
06. Entry Fee 0.806 
08. Advertising fee 0.403 
09. Contract length 0.719 
01. Number of outlets 0.665 
Factor 2 
11. Age of the company 0.810 
12. Years franchising 0.815 
13. Years pre-franchising 0.671 
Factor 3 
02. Geographical dispersion -0.847 
03. Outlets opened per year 0.685 
Factor 4 
04. Franchise opened per year 0.844 
10. %of outlets franchised 0.724 
Factor 5 
07. Royalty(% of sales) 0.899 
5 is only embodied by 'royalty (% of sales)'. The variance explained by the five 
factors is slightly over 69 %. 
As previously explained, two tools were used to contrast H2. First, the non-
parametric test of Kruskai-Wallis, which is the equivalent one-way ANOVA when 
the variables do not fulfil the requirements of normality, was used. It was verified 
that the five groups differ significantly in 12 of the 13 analyzed variables. All of 
them present a p-value equal to or under 0.05, except for the variable 'advertising 
fee'. These results confirm H1• 
Nevertheless, as did Castrogiavani et al. (1995) and Lopez and Ventura (2001) 
, we also ran a cluster analysis, trying to verify if the resultant groups of franchisors 
are similar to those arising from the factorial analysis. When applying K-means 
cluster analysis, similarities with other studies or the groups resulting from the 
factor analysis do not appear, thus, creating 5 groups. In view of these results, we 
coincide with Castrogiavanni's et al. (1995) commentaries, with regard to the 
scarce convergence between the groups formed by the cluster analysis compared 
to those that arose from the factorial analysis. 
Five strategic groups were obtained according to their features and their 
fit for the proposed names. In table 7, a comparison between the results of 
this study and those of Carney and Gedajlovic is presented. Some aspects are 
worth noting. 
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• In strategic group n° 2, called ' conservative and expensive franchisors' 
four variables load together in both researches: 'average investment', 'entry 
fee', 'advertising fee' and 'contract length'. 
• In strategic group n° 3, called ' franchisors re-converted ' two variables 
load together: 'age of the company' and 'years pre-franchising'. 
Both types are very similar in both works. 
• In strategic group n ° 1, 'rapid growers', only the variable 'franchises opened 
per year' loads together in both studies. 
• In the strategic group n° 4, 'mature franchisors', only the variable 
'geographical dispersion' loads together in both studies. 
• Finally, in the strategic group n° 5, 'unsuccessful', only the variable 'royalty 
(%fee of sales)' loads together in both studies. 
The last three types of franchisors are only partially identified in the 
aforementioned studies. 
Hypothesis 2 is partially confirmed based on these results, although some 
variables do not match exactly in both studies. 
7. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS 
7 .1. Discussion 
It can be corroborated that in the Portuguese franchising system, several 
strategic groups exist and, therefore, different types of franchisors. In this case, 
five strategic groups were identified. The groups found are very logical, real and 
close to other studies carried out in Canada, USA, and Spain (Carney and 
Gedajlovic, 1991; Catrogiovanni et al, 1995; Rondfm et al., 2006) so the 
globalization of the franchising strategic groups is starting to become a reality. A 
description of them is given in table 8. 
Group 1: 'Expensive Franchisors'. This is the group that presents the 
highest costs of adhesion (investment). The financial investments demanded 
from the franchisees- such as entry fee, royalty of sales and advertising fee-
present a higher value than in any other group. Also, they offer the longest 
contracts. The control difficulties of franchisors, due to the geographical 
dispersion of the outlets, make them demand a few high financial 
considerations from the franchisees, in order to avoid opportunist behavior. 
They are in second place in total number of units; they adopted franchising as 
a growth mechanism after eight years on average. Their higher brand equity, 
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TABLE 7 
Similarities or differences with Carney and Gedalojvic (1991) 
Carney Portugal 
Strategic group 1: 'Rapid Growers' Factor 1 Factor 4 
03. Outlets opened per year 0.916 
04. Franchises opened per year 0.962 0.844 
10. % of outlets franchised 0.724 
itrategic group 2: 'Conservatives and expensive' Factor 2 Factor 1 
05. Average investment 0.783 0.702 
06. Entry Fee 0.760 0.806 
08. Advertising fee 0.607 0.403 
09. Contract length 0.625 0.719 
01. Number of outlets 0.665 
Strategic group 3: 'Re-converted" Factor 3 Factor 2 
11. Age of the company 0.932 0.810 
13. Years pre-franchising 0.980 0.671 
12. Years franchising 0.815 
Strategic group 4: 'Matures' Factor 4 Factor 3 
01. Number of outlets 0.708 
02. Geographical dispersion -0.604 -0.847 
12. Years franchising 0.878 
03. Outlets opened per year 0.685 
Strategic group 5: 'Unsuccessful' Factor 5 Factor 5 
07. Royalty (% of sales) - 0.737 0.899 
10. %of outlets franchised 0.791 
TABLE 8 
Differences between types of franchisors in Portugal 
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Know How, etc., justify the higher fees that franchisees have to pay to the franchisors 
included in this strategic group. 
Group 2: 'Re-converted'. They are franchisors that have been exercising their 
commercial activity for many years (33 years on average), which makes them the 
oldest group of the sample. This group adopted franchising later (after 19 years), 
although they have been operating longest in franchising in Portugal (8 years on 
average). Moreover, they present a very limited growth rate. 
Group 3: 'Mature'. This is the group that presents the greatest number of 
outlets, 697 units on average. Their annual growth of outlets is the highest, which 
justifies the search for new markets to be able to support the rhythm of expansion. 
The annual growth of franchised units in Portugal is high too, the second of all the 
groups. However, they suffer the lowest lowest rate of internationalization. 
Group 4: 'Rapid growers'. These are the franchisors that are the youngest (5 
years). The name 'franchisors in rapid growth' justifies itself because the growth 
rate is very high. The franchised units opened per year (an average of 14. 5) display 
the highest growth of all the groups. Furthermore, they are very confident in 
franchising because 86.27% are franchised units. In spite of their youth, they 
show a very high number of outlets (second to the mature group). In order to be 
able to grow rapidly, they present the lowest conditions of adhesion (costs) of all 
the groups regarding initial investment and entry fee. 
Group 5: 'Unsuccessful franchisors'. This group includes the franchisors 
with the second worst growth ratio and the lowest total units. In addition, they 
demand the highest royalties and the second most expensive advertising fees. 
To sum up, the existence of strategic groups in the Portuguese franchising 
system is verified. Another important conclusion that is a novel result of this 
work is the coincidence among the features of Portuguese franchising strategic 
groups and other franchisor types analysed in other countries. This fact means 
that the strategies of franchising cross national borders and tend towards 
globalization. 
7.2. Implications for managers 
The study of strategic groups is an essential tool to analyze the competitive 
structure of any sector of activity. The existence of franchisor types is very useful 
for the knowledge of the prior elements of the franchising system (franchisors and 
franchisees). 
In franchising, certain variables (investment, entry fee, royalties, geographical 
dispersion, etc.) operate as explanatory factors of the managerial behavior and, in 
consequence, of the strategy used to compete in a certain combination of product-
markets. These variables, which sustain the creation of mobility barriers in the 
110 
PoRTUGUESE JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, VOL. X/, N. Q 2, 2006 
sector, are the origin of the strategic groups within franchising. These results lead 
us to affirm that franchising, more than a sector of activity, is a form of trade that 
can be used in any sector of activity as a strategy for growth. Moreover, it can differ 
depending on the supporting strategic variables. 
We highlight the fact that the results obtained in the group of franchisors 
differ according to the applied methodology. This way, the groups that arise from 
factor analysis present many differences from those originating from cluster analysis. 
However, it seems that when looking for strategic groups, it is better to use factor 
analysis than cluster analysis, as Nath and Gruca (1997) noted. 
It is important not only to weigh the application of a certain methodology for 
the search of strategic groups, but to question if the variables chosen are really 
explanatory of the managerial behavior, that is to say, if they have a strategic 
nature. When this occurs, the different managerial behaviors might explain the 
different results in terms of growth of sales, profitability, market share, etc., of the 
companies included in the different strategic groups. 
8. LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Like every research project, this study contains limitations that can help 
academics to orientate future research. 
The first limitation comes from the variables selected for the configuration of 
the strategic groups. Their strategic nature is not doubted. Nevertheless, comparison 
with previous articles led us to exclude variables that might be considered of great 
importance in explaining the managerial behavior such as: the competitive sector, 
the degree of internationalization, the risk associated with the franchising, etc. 
This constitutes a new challenge that we expect to be able to solve in future 
research. 
A second limitation of this work relates to the lack of a temporal perspective. 
According to Flaviim and Polo (1999) as a previous step for identifying strategic 
groups, it is necessary to fix if the study is going to be longitudinal or related to a 
unique point in time. This is a challenge for future research. 
Thirdly, till now only strategic groups for franchising of four countries are 
coincident. Contrasting globalization of this phenomenon requires the extension of 
the study to other countries. 
Finally, we highlight that the groups obtained are heterogeneous amongst 
each other and homogeneous within each type. However, this fact does not mean 
that inside the groups companies present differences. In this respect, it is necessary 
to carry out qualitative studies on the companies included in each group and 
verify if differences continue to exist in their behavior and performance. 
111 
PORTUGUESE JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, VOL. X/, N. 0 2, 2006 
References 
Alan I. (2001). The Use of Franchising by US-Based Retailers, Journal of Small Management, 39 
(2), 111-122. 
Barroso, C. et al. (2001). Los grupos estrategicos en el sector minorista: El caso de Andalucfa. Non 
idem iterum semper novum. Seville, Spain.Digital@tres. 
Baum, J. and Mezias, S.J. (1992). Localized competition and organizational failure in the Manhat-
tan hotel industry, 1898-1990, Administrative Science Quarterly, 37, 580-604. 
Bradach, J.L. (1997). Using the Plural Form in Management of Restaurant Chaina, Administrative 
Science Quartely, 42, 276-303. 
Bradach, J.L. (1998). Franchise organizations. Boston, M.A. Harvard Business School Press. 
Brickley, J.A. Dark, F. H. and Weisbach, M.S. (1991). An agency perspective on franchising, Finan-
cial Management, 20, 27-35. 
Brickley, J.A. and Dark, F.H. (1987). The choice of organizational form: The case of franchising, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 18 (June), 401-420. 
Calderon, E. (1998). Los costes de Ia agencia en los canales de distribuci6n: Ia franquicia, Ph. D. 
Dissertation, University of Burgos (Spain). 
Carney, M. and Gedajlovic, E. (1991 ). Vertical integration in franchise systems: Agency theory and 
resource explanations, Strategic Management Journal, 12 (8), 607-629. 
Castrogiovanni, G.J., Bennett, N. and Combs, J.G. (1995). Franchisor types: Reexamination and 
clarification, Journal of Small Business Management, 33 (1), 45-55. 
Castrogiovanni, G.J.; Combs, J.G. and Justis, R.T. (2006): Resources Scarcity and Agency Theory 
predictions concerning the continued use of franchising in multi-outlet networks, Journal of 
Small Business Management, 44 (1), 27-44. 
Caves, R.E. and Murphy, W. F. II. (1976). Franchising: Firms, markets, and intangible assets. 
Southern Economic Journal. 42, 572-586 
Combs J.G. and Ketchen. D.J. (1999) Can capital scarcity help agency theory explain franchising? 
Revisiting the capital scarcity hypothesis. Academy of Management Journal 42 (2), 196-
207. 
Combs J.G. and Ketchen, D.J. (2003). Why do firms use franchising as an entrepreneurial strategy? 
A meta-analysis, Journal of Management, 29 (3), 443-465. 
Combs, J.G. and Castrogiovanni, G.J. (1994). Franchisor strategy: A proposed model and empirical 
test of franchise versus company ownership, Journal of Small Business Management, 32 (2), 
37-48. 
Combs, J.G.; Ketchen, D.J. and Hoover, V.L. (2004). A strategic group approach to the franchising-
performance relationship, Journal of Business Venturing, 19 (6), 877-897. 
Cool, K. and Schendel, D. (1987). Strategic group formation and performance: the case of U.S. 
Pharmaceutical industry 1963-1982, Management Science, 30 (9), 1102-1124. 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt, E.J. (1985). The impact of export strategy on export sales performance, 
Journal of International Business Studies, Spring, 37-55. 
Dfez, E.C. and Galan, J.L. (1989). El franchising: Espana y Ia CEE. Consideraciones legales, 
lnvestigaci6n y Marketing AEDEMO, 30, 31-42. 
Dfez, E.C. and Rondan, F.J. (2004). La investigaci6n sabre franquicia, Revista de Investigaciones 
Europeas de Direcci6n y Economfa de Ia Empresa, 10 (3), 71-96. 
Dfez, E.C., Rondan, F.J. and Navarro, A. (2004). Research on franchising, in Global business: 
coping with uncertainty, I.M.D.A. International Management Development Research Year-
book, Edited by Kaynak, E. and Harcar, T. Maastricht, The Netherlands, 430-437. 
Elango, B. and Fried, V. H. (1997). Franchising Research: A Literature Review and Synthesis, Jour-
nal of Small Business Management, 35 (3), 68-81. 
Falbe, C.M., Dandridge, T.C. and Kumar, A. (1999). The effect of organizational context on entrepre-
neurial strategies in franchising, Journal of Business Venturing, 4 (1), 125-140. 
112 
PORTUGUESE JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, VOL. X/, N. Q 2, 2006 
Fiegenbaum, A. and Thomas, H. (1990).1ndustry and strategic group dynamics: competitive strat-
egy in the insurance industry, Journal of Management Studies, 30, 69-105. 
Fiegenbaum, A. and Thomas, H. (1990). Strategic Groups and performance: the U.S. insurance 
industry, 1970-1984, Strategic ManagementJournal, 11 (3), 197-215. 
Hunt, M. (1972). Competition in the major home appliance industry 1960-1970, Ph. D. disserta-
tion, Harvard University. 
Hunt, S.D. (1973). The Trend Toward Company-Operated Units in Franchise Chains, Journal of 
Retailing, 49 (2), 3-12. 
Klein, B. (1995). The Economics of Franchise Contracts, Journal of Corporate Finance, 2, 9-37. 
Krueger, A.B. (1991). Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast 
Food Industry, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 75-101. 
Lafontaine, F. (1992). Agency theory and franchising: Some empirical results, Rand Journal of 
Economics, 23 (2), 263-283. 
Lafontaine, F. and Kaufmann, P.J. (1994). The evolution of ownership patterns in franchise systems, 
Journal of Retailing, 70 (2), 97-113. 
Lafontaine, F. and Shaw, K. (1996). The dynamics of franchise contracting: Evidence from Panel 
Data., National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper, no. 5585. Cambridge. 
Lee, J.; Lee, K. and Rho, S. (2002). An evolutionary perspective on strategic group emergent: a 
genetic algorithm-based model, Strategic Management Journal, 23 (8), 727-739. 
Lopez, B. and Ventura, J. (2001). Grupos estrategicos en las franquicias espafiolas, Economfa 
industrial, 340 (4), 163-176. 
Lopez, M.B. and Ventura, J. (2002). lntegracion vertical y causas de aparicion de Ia franquicia, 
Revista Europea de Direcci6n y Economfa de Ia Empresa, 11 (4), 55-74. 
Martin, R.E. (1988). Franchising and risk management, American Economic Review, 78 (5), 954-
968. 
Martin, R.E. and Justis, R. (1993). Franchising, lfquidity constraints and entry, Applied Economics, 
25, 1269-1277. 
Mas, F.J. (1996). Competencia y dinamica de grupos estrategicos. Aplicacion al sector bancario 
espafiol, Secretariado de publicaciones, University of Alicante (Spain). 
Mathewson, G. and Winter, R. (1985). The economics of franchise contracts, Journal of Law and 
Political Economics, 28, 503-26. 
McNamara, G.; Deephouse, D.L. and Luce, R.A. (2003). Competitive positioning within and across 
a strategic group structure: the performance of core, secondary, and solitary firms, Strategic 
ManagementJournal, 24 (2), 161-174. 
Molina, J.F. y Quer, D. (2003) Porter's generic strategies, strategic groups and firm performance in 
the construction industry: a complementary test. Estudos de Gestao- Portuguese Journal of 
Management Studies, Vol. 8 (1), pp. 23-39. 
Mora, M.A. (2002). Teorias que justifican el uso de Ia franquicia: contraste empirico, Revista de 
Economfa y Empresa, 46 (XVII). 
Nath, D. and Sudharshan, D. (1994). Measuring strategy coherence through patterns of strategic 
choices, Strategic Management Journal, 15 (1), 43-61. 
Nath, D. and Gruca, T. (1997). Convergence across alternative methods for forming strategic groups, 
Strategic Management Journal, 18 (9), 7 45-760. 
Norton, S.W. (1988a). Franchising, brand name capital, and the entrepreneurial capacity problem, 
Strategic Management Journal, 9, 105-114. 
Norton, S.W. (1988b). An empirical look at franchising as an organizational form, Journal of Busi-
ness, 61, 197-217. 
Norton, S.W. (1995). Is franchising a capital structure issue?, Journal of Corporate Finance, 2, 75-101. 
Oxenfeldt, A.R. and Kelly, A.O. (1969). Will successful franchise systems ultimately become wholly-
owned chains?, Journal of Retailing, 44, 69-87. 
Porter, M.E. (1979). The structure within industries and company performance, Review of Econom-
ics and Statistics, 61, 214-227. 
113 
PORTUGUESE JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, VOL •. X/, N.g 2, 2006 
Rondan F.J.; Navarro, A. y Dfez, E. C. (2006) Strategic groups: the case of the Spanish franchising. 
Proceedings at the 5th 'Marketing Trends' International Congress, Venice (Italy), January 20th-
21'1. 
Rubin, P. (1978). The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract, Journal of Law 
and Economics, 21, 223-233. 
Shane, S.A. ( 1996). Hybrid organizational arrangements and their implications for firm growth and 
survival: A study of new franchisors, Academy of Management Journal, 39, 216-234. 
Thomas, H. and Carroll, C. (1994). Theoretical and empirical links between strategic groups, cog-
nitive communities, and networks of interacting firms, in Daems, H. and Thomas, H. eds, 
Strategies groups, strategic movies and performance. Pergamon, Tarry-town, New York, 7-
29. 
114 
